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Minima Pedagogica: Education, Thinking
and Experience in Adorno
ITAY SNIR
This article attempts to think of thinking as the essence of
critical education. While contemporary education tends to
stress the conveying of knowledge and skills needed to succeed
in the present-day information society, the present article turns
to the work of Theodor W. Adorno to develop alternative
thinking about education, thinking and the political
significance of education for thinking.
Adorno touched upon educational questions throughout his
writings, with growing interest in the last ten years of his life.
Education, he argues following Kant, must enable students to
think for themselves and to break free of the authority of
teachers, parents and other adults. Nevertheless, in his
discussions of education Adorno says little about the nature of
thinking, and the secondary literature on his educational
theory addresses this question only cursorily.
Important claims on the nature of thinking do appear
elsewhere in Adorno’s work. From his early writings up to
Negative Dialectics, Adorno is preoccupied with thinking,
sketching the outlines of critical-dialectical thought. Still,
these reflections rarely touch upon educational questions, and
the Adorno scholarship has yet to establish this link. Unlike
studies which read Adorno’s educational thought against the
backdrop of the history of education and the German Bildung
tradition, or in relation to art and aesthetics, the present
article brings together Adorno’s ideas on education and
thinking in an attempt to contribute both to the Adorno
scholarship and to the growing field of education for thinking.
INTRODUCTION
This article attempts to think of thinking as the essence of critical education.
While contemporary education tends to stress the conveying of knowledge
and skills needed to succeed in the present-day information society, the
perspective offered here suggests that the core of educational practice should
be the very activity of thinking. Scholarly work on education for thinking
often emphasises critical thought and points to the contribution of such
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education to democratic citizenship (Kuhn, 2008; Lipman, 2003; McPeck,
1990; Rhoder and French, 2012; Siegel, 1988). However, this scholarship
tends to view thinking in terms of formal logic or procedural rationality,
reducing it to ‘thinking skills’, or techniques to be mastered and applied in
the job market. It is therefore sociopolitically conservative. In what follows
I turn to the work of Theodor W. Adorno to develop alternative thinking
about education, thinking, and the political significance of education for
thinking.
Adorno touched upon educational questions throughout his writings, with
growing interest in the last ten years of his life (French and Thomas, 1999;
Heins, 2012). He famously claimed that in the absence of a real possibil-
ity of changing ‘objective’ social conditions—capitalism and its attendant
mechanisms of domination—emphasis must be laid on the ‘subjective’ con-
ditions that produce violence and suffering, namely on personality structures
and mindsets that may be ameliorated through education (Adorno, 2005d,
p. 192). In ‘Education for Maturity and Responsibility’ (1999 [1969])—a
radio talk recorded shortly before his untimely death—Adorno rests his
educational approach on Kant’s ‘An Answer to the Question: What is
Enlightenment?’ (2003) which equates enlightenment with maturity and
independent thinking. Education, argues Adorno following Kant, must en-
able students to think for themselves and to break free of the authority of
teachers, parents and other adults. Nevertheless, in his discussions of ed-
ucation Adorno says little about the nature of thinking, and the secondary
literature on his educational theory addresses this question only cursorily
(Gur-Ze’ev, 2010).
Important claims on the nature of thinking do appear elsewhere in
Adorno’s work. From his early writings up to Negative Dialectics (2003a
[1966]), Adorno is preoccupied with thinking: he criticises prevalent ways
of thinking, examines the relationships of thought to rationality and emo-
tions, and sketches the outlines of critical-dialectical thought. Still, these
reflections rarely touch upon educational questions, and the Adorno schol-
arship has yet to establish this link. Unlike studies which read Adorno’s
educational thought against the backdrop of the history of education and
the German Bildung tradition (Pongratz, 2008; Thompson, 2006), or in re-
lation to art and aesthetics (Kertz-Welzel, 2005; Papastephanou, 2006), the
present article brings together Adorno’s ideas on education and thinking in
an attempt to contribute both to the Adorno scholarship and to the growing
field of education for thinking.
The remainder of the article proceeds as follows. The first section reflects
on the importance of thinking for Adorno and his understanding of genuine
thinking as a critical activity. The key for critical thinking, according to
Adorno, is experience, namely openness on the part of the subject to the ob-
ject’s particularity. As Adorno views thinking as essentially confrontational
and ‘negative’, the second section presents its relation to experience by con-
trasting it with another approach to education, thinking and experience—
John Dewey’s. Unlike the latter, for Adorno thinking of an object does
not amount to subsuming it under general rules, but rather to experiencing
it as ‘non-identical’, transcending all general categories. In the following
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two sections I argue that such thinking finds its proper place at school, and
that its proper form is not public discussion but rather the writing of essays.
I conclude by terming this type of education that is focused on thinking as
action minima pedagogica.
THINKING AS ACTION
As the opening sentences of Dialectic of Enlightenment (Adorno and
Horkheimer, 2007 [1944]) make clear, the primary illness Adorno diag-
noses in Western civilisation, in the Enlightenment in the historical sense,
is domination (Herrschaft). Domination is not limited to the sphere of eco-
nomics and relations of production, but penetrates all aspects of psychic
and social life. As already understood byMarx, consciousness too is shaped
by relations of domination, and plays an active part in reproducing them.
But unlike orthodox Marxism, Adorno does not think that the relation-
ship between domination and consciousness is limited to ideology in the
simple sense of explicit and implicit beliefs (knowledge and prejudice, re-
spectively). Following Gyo¨rgy Luka´cs (1972), he claims it influences the
very way consciousness works, namely the forms and structures thinking
assumes.
The heart of the matter is the concept of reason. Reason, which is origi-
nally and essentially a means of self-preservation (Adorno, 2005f, p. 272),
has been of crucial importance in protecting human beings against nature
and prolonging their lives, but has become, through the process of enlighten-
ment, an instrument through which the rational subject dominates not only
the objective world but also other subjects, as well as oneself (Adorno
and Horkheimer, 2007). Instead of reflecting on the values and mean-
ings of human existence—what Max Horkheimer (2004) called ‘objective
reason’ —reason reduces itself to finding efficient means to given ends;
given, that is, by existing society. Aimed only at future benefits, such rea-
son ignores the unique qualities of every object and is reduced to what
Adorno calls ‘identification’, namely recognition of what is similar in dif-
ferent things in order to subsume them under the same concept (2003a,
p. 5). Identity thinking, which is tightly connected to the social structure
dominated by the principle of exchange which quantifies and equalises all
values, is therefore inherently blind to un-exchangeable particularity.
ForAdorno, however, identification is not thinking at all: unlikeDescartes
(2008), who took everything that occurs in the mind to be a kind of thought,
for Adorno mental processes which accept reality as given and proceed
only along rigorous, predictable logical procedures, are not worthy of the
title ‘thinking’: ‘Those alone think who do not passively accept the already
given’ (Adorno, 2005f, p. 264). Hence positive science, which rests on
unconditional acceptance of data and applying logical procedures of truth
preservation, in fact turns thinking into an empty ritual, a mere sequence of
actions, exempting those engaged in it from the trouble of thinking (2005b,
p. 33).
Yet, although Adorno rejects thinking as taking place in an independent
‘inner realm’ (2005a, p. 15) detached from social reality, the possibility of
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thinking in a way that transcends the prevalent social logic is by no means
eliminated by reality. Real, critical thinking, which recognises objects in
their non-identical particularity, is always an open possibility. Such thinking
is first and foremost negative, as it fractures ‘the so-called train of thought
that is unrefractedly expected from thinking’ (2005c, p. 131), namely, rejects
reality as it is and refuses to settle for preserving the ‘truth’ of its appearance.
In this sense thinking is always also a form of challenging reality—a form
of political resistance: ‘Thinking is a doing, theory a form of praxis; already
the ideology of the purity of thinking deceives about this. Thinking has
a double character: it is immanently determined and rigorous, and yet an
inalienably real mode of behavior in the midst of reality’ (2005f, p. 261).
Adorno, in other words, rejects the simplistic distinction between theory and
praxis, between thought and action; thinking is for him not only a necessary
condition for oppositional activity but also action in its own right: ‘Whoever
thinks, offers resistance’ (2005f, p. 263).
The ultimate expression of critical, oppositional thought is of course
philosophy. Not institutional philosophy, the two dominant trends of
which—American positivism and European ontology—notwithstanding
their fundamental differences, profoundly share the positioning of
metaphysics as an enemy and the view of thought itself as ‘a necessary
evil’ (2005a, pp. 8–9). Philosophy worthy of its name, which insists on
actively thinking the non-identical, is ‘the force of resistance inherent in
each individual’s own thought, a force that opposes the narrow-minded
acquisition of factual knowledge, even in the so-called philosophical
specialties’ (2005b, p. 22). The rejection of mainstream institutional
philosophy also means, therefore, that resistant thinking is by no means the
exclusive business of professional philosophers, and its proper abode is not
necessarily academia. Recognising no predetermined limits, philosophy
may be practiced by the commonest people in the most ordinary places.
Can such thinking be practiced by children, however? And if so, can it
find a place at school, the quintessential disciplinary site (Foucault, 1995)
identified by Marxist tradition as an ideological state apparatus where obe-
dience and conformism are inculcated (Althusser, 1971)? And can critical,
autonomous thinking be at all taught? I suggest the answers that can be
given to these questions through Adorno’s thought are affirmative.
EDUCATION, THINKING AND EXPERIENCE
In his famous lecture ‘Education after Auschwitz’ (2005d [1966]), Adorno
states that the only education that has any sense at all—that can follow
the ‘new categorical imperative’ to prevent the recurrence of the horror
embodied in the word Auschwitz—is education for autonomous thinking.
Following Kant, he characterises such thinking as ‘the power of reflection,
of self-determination, of not cooperating’ (2005d, p. 195). But contrary to
appearance, autonomous thinking for Adorno is by no means introspective
contemplation or what Hannah Arendt describes as temporary withdrawal
from the world (1978, p. 47). Any attempt by the thinking subject to disen-
gage from the object is not only impossible, but primarily a clear expression
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of bourgeois individualist ideology which rests on the assumption of an ab-
stract, ahistorical subject. The real subject always exists in relation to the
objective world, and self-reflective thought must ‘surrender itself to the
subject matter’ (Adorno, 2005c, p. 129), and give precedence to the object
before it dialectically returns to the subject. As Iain Macdonald (2011) ex-
plains, Adorno’s concept of autonomous thinking differs from that of Kant
in that it involves an intimate connection with things, live contact with their
‘warmth’. For this reason, ‘The key position of the subject in cognition is
experience’ (Adorno, 2005e, p. 254).
The relationship between thinking and experience, particularly in the ed-
ucational context, has been put forward by Dewey, one of the founding
fathers of the modern philosophy of education. Despite the obvious dif-
ferences between the two philosophers, Dewey’s views on education and
thinking—which have laid the foundations for much of the contemporary
discussion of the subject—share many concerns with Adorno and are there-
fore a proper background for addressing Adorno’s views. In Democracy
and Education (2004), Dewey presents the importance of thinking to edu-
cation as a reaction to Plato’s paradox of learning: As Socrates explains in
Plato’s ‘Meno’ (1997, p. 880), learning is impossible because if we know in
advance what we are searching for, no learning can take place; and if we do
not knowwhat we are looking for we would not know that we have found it.
According to Dewey, this paradox rests on the false assumption that there
are only two possibilities—complete knowledge or complete ignorance—
and views learning as an instantaneous transition from one to the other;
while learning in fact requires a process of thinking which is a hypothet-
ical journey in an unknown land, ‘feeling one’s way along provisionally’
(Dewey, 2004, p. 161), as he puts it.
To find its way, according to Dewey, thought has to be attentive to
its surroundings, to what lies outside: ‘The material of thinking is not
thoughts, but actions, facts, events, and the relations of things’ (2004,
p. 170). Thinking, therefore, is connected to experience both as sensation
and as experimentation; it involves recognising the connection between the
active element of experience (trying) and its passive element (undergoing),
between what we do to things and what they do to us:
Thinking [ . . . ] is the intentional endeavor to discover specific con-
nections between something which we do and the consequences which
result, so that the two become continuous. Their isolation, and con-
sequently their purely arbitrary going together, is cancelled; a unified
developing situation takes its place. The occurrence is now under-
stood; it is explained; it is reasonable, as we say, that the thing should
happen as it does (Dewey, 2004, p. 158).
In this way, thinking aims at finding new ways for coping with the prob-
lems encountered while experiencing the world. Education for thinking,
therefore, cannot amount to one-way transference of ‘thinking skills’ from
teacher to student, but must involve an encounter of the student with the
world itself; an encounter in which she is encouraged to be attentive to
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connections between phenomena and look for creative ways of doing things
with them, of using them to solve problems. As suggested by the title of
Dewey’s book, such education is democratic, but not in the direct, civic-
political sense: It is democratic because it rejects the traditional hierarchy
of knowledge and replaces it with independent student activity, in which
the teacher is merely a partner: ‘In such shared activity, the teacher is a
learner, and the learner is, without knowing it, a teacher’ (p. 174). To be
sure, the teacher is not superfluous in this process, as he has to create the
conditions in which the student’s surroundings appear to her as a challeng-
ing problem—not as a trivial hindrance or unsurpassable obstacle, but as a
thought-provoking difficulty (pp. 167–171; 1997, pp. 51–60).
Yet Dewey’s pragmatism, which values thinking according to its use-
fulness, leads in the final analysis to what Adorno sees as the logic of
domination. Although Dewey does not reduce thinking to empty formal
procedures and emphasises its creative aspects, the entire cognitive process
is subordinated to practical outcomes and validated according to success and
failure criteria. This opens the door to instrumental reason: to understanding
the world in order to dominate it.
Hence,Dewey’s pragmatism risks succumbing to the principle of identity.
FromAdorno’s perspective, as Deweyan thinking consists of understanding
the lawful connections between objects, it must perceive each object as a
representative of a general category. It looks for similarities in an attempt
to subsume them under conceptual categories, to be able to control them by
formulating permanent connections. Hence, the experience presupposed by
such thinking is also ‘identical’, in Adorno’s terms—even though Dewey
stresses the importance of the new and unexpected in experience, the aim
of thinking is ultimately to eliminate this dimension, to assimilate the new
in an ‘experiential continuum’ (1997, p. 33) where the future is in principle
identical to the past and present. Even the experiencing subject, therefore,
does not change significantly as a result of her experiences; she only ‘grows’
as she accumulates experiences (p. 36), becoming equipped with more
experiential resources in the form of cognitive and conceptual means to
deal with new experiences.1
For Adorno, on the other hand, identical experience, in which everything
new becomes more of the same, reduced to utility and use value, is no
experience at all. When contact with things is limited to operation alone,
he writes, the result is ‘the withering of experience’ (2002, p. 40). Real
experience involves encounters with the non-identical as such, with what
transcends available concepts. To experience it, thinking must be engaged
with ‘the moment of the subject matter itself’ (2005c, pp. 130–131) in a
way that allows it to appear non-identical—a way that does not attempt to
capture the object and exhaust it with pre-given concepts, but rather lets
the object act upon the subject (Thompson, 2005, pp. 525–526). Thinking,
therefore, plays a crucial role in allowing experience to take place: it does
so by giving itself to the object and opening itself to its unique singularity,
not by searching for its lawful causal relations with other objects: ‘Thought
acquires its depth from penetrating deeply into a matter, not from referring
it back to something else’ (Adorno, 2000, p. 99). Hence, real experience
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cannot be accumulated: Not only are past experiences inefficient means for
dealing with new ones, they might even stand in their way, for thinking
habits acquired through past experiences may blind one to the non-identical
in the object and thereby thwart thinking.
SUBJECT, OBJECT AND SUBJECT MATTER
Most subject-object encounters cannot but obey the logic of identity and
domination. In everyday life people must attain various goals, and the things
around them are inevitably means to given ends. Giving precedence to the
object over the subject’s needs requires a certain suspension of the everyday
world and its practical demands; thinking requires its time and space. School
is the ultimate site which can provide such time and space—it takes children
away from family and society and offers them a place where the demands
of the outside world are suspended, rendered inoperative (Masschelein and
Simons, 2013). Adorno’s view of thinking and experience can therefore
be understood as a call to turn schools from sites in which knowledge of
the world is treated as possession and investment—what he called ‘semi-
education’ (Halbbildung) (2003b)—into ones in which the world is an
object of thinking.
For school education to provoke thinking it must not put the student—
and certainly not the teacher—in the centre. Centre stage must be given
to the object of experience, to subject-matter over the subject-student and
the subject-teacher. That is to say, the subject-matter on the table at school
is there not only as an object of knowledge to be transferred from teacher
to student, but rather as a kind of subject in its own right—the object, so
to speak, is invited to speak and act, while the subject (student) is required to
listen and attend. To be sure, the material to be studied needs not be material
in the simple, physical sense, and the sensory aspect of experiencing it may
be minimal. The nature of the object is unimportant, since every subject-
matter can provoke thinking—philosophical text or historical document,
mathematical formulae or physical phenomena, diesel engine or woodwork.
Every lesson on every subject is an opportunity for thinking, for critical,
philosophical reflection on what it offers for study (2005b, p. 21) —all that
is needed is the time and space to take the subject matter as an object of
thought rather than knowledge. The teacher, of course, cannot teach students
to think the way he teaches knowledge, but he can certainly provide them
with the conditions for thinking, primarily time and space.
Moreover, for Adorno thinking of the subject matter cannot abide peace-
fully with knowledge, as a complementary or parallel process. Critical
thinking is not reflection on the knowledge of the object, but on the object
itself; it seeks the truth of the object, which contradicts accepted knowl-
edge: ‘knowledge comes to us through a network of prejudices, opinions,
innervations, self-corrections, presuppositions and exaggerations, in short
through the dense, firmly-founded but by no means uniformly transpar-
ent medium of [accumulated] experience’ (2002, p. 80). In the activity of
thinking the subject who gives herself over to experience ‘rends the veil it
[knowledge] weaves about the object’ (2005e, p. 254). Seeking the truth
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of the object is therefore an attempt—always only partly successful—to
remove the cataract of social categories, to contact the object not through
its possible uses, its place in the established historical narrative, or its value
according to the mainstream culture industry.
This is why thinking that gives itself over to the object always also
expands beyond the specific object and into the broader sociopolitical con-
text: Although it does not look for lawful connections between its object
and others, it by nomeans treats it as isolated from its surroundings. It rather
operates in a way Adorno calls ‘expansive concentration’: ‘By gauging its
subject matter, and it alone, thinking becomes aware of what within the mat-
ter extends beyond what was previously thought and thereby breaks open
the fixed purview of the subject matter’ (2005c, p. 131). As Iain Macdonald
puts it, such thinking is ‘the ability to reflect objectivity [ . . . ] in order to
reveal the (dys)functional context of the status quo’ (2011, pp. 10–11). That
is to say, in the gap between how the object ordinarily appears and its truth
which flickers through the activity of thinking, the alienation and distortion
of the entire social reality is disclosed and brought to consciousness: Ev-
ery single object testifies that society views everything as interchangeable
and does not allow it to appear as what it really is. Thus, every object of
study can become subject matter through which the whole is revealed; to
borrow a turn of phrase from Jacques Rancie`re (1991), ‘everything is in
everything’.
This is why for Adorno critical thinking is no mere theoretical work,
but ‘a praxis that lives within the contradictions of the moment in order to
articulate them in its very form’ (Lewis, 2006, p. 4). This praxis is of course
essentially negative. It does not offer a positive alternative, and consists
of the refusal to accept the object as it usually appears (Stojanov, 2012,
pp. 126–127). But even negativity is not simply given to thought, does
not reveal itself as such to experience; the thinking subject must actively
negate the object, thereby constituting it as a problem. Unlike Dewey, for
whom the teacher is responsible for setting the stage in which the student
experiences the problems and remains in control of the educational situ-
ation, here problematisation is part of the thinking activity and is under
the thinking student’s full responsibility. This is, then, a much more rad-
ical form of democratic education: Democratic relationships of equality
are founded on a relationship of non-domination with the object, and are
reflected in student-teacher relationships, for the latter is responsible for cre-
ating the negative conditions for thinking, namely for providing the time and
space it requires, but not for generating thought through artificial positive
intervention.
We can even say, in fact, that when the student thinks, it is not the
teacher but rather the object which educates her: as the subject-student
opens herself up to the subject-matter she cannot retain her identity
after experiencing the non-identical. Her conceptual categories, the
presuppositions guiding her everyday interaction with the world, are
revealed to be insufficient and necessarily change through the act of
thinking the non-identical (Thompson, 2006, p. 83).
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Moreover, it is only through genuine thinking which prioritises the object
that the student really becomes a subject. Whoever accepts pre-existing
knowledge, takes the object to be an empirical given in an existing web of
concepts, or limits oneself to logical procedures, is not exactly a subject; he
is merely an abstract, general and illusory subject, hence somewhat of an
object, a product of the social process of reification. The activity of thinking
which seeks the truth of the object makes the thinker a real subject—a
concrete person, anchored in her sociopolitical surrounding without being
completely absorbed into it. Education for thinking, therefore, politicises
both object and subject, enabling them to temporarily suspend the logic of
identification and domination; not, to be sure, to reach a safe haven, but
rather to develop a point of view from which the danger inherent in this
logic is even more apparent and present (Thompson, 2005, p. 528).
THE ESSAY AS A FORM OF THINKING
As we have seen, thinking involves not only passive openness to material,
but also active work with it. This activity is much different from that
described by Dewey, which is aimed at dominating the object and is valued
according to a practical test of results. For Adorno the activity of thinking
takes place in language, or more precisely in the passage to language,
in translating the object into the linguistic dimension: ‘Thinking begins
in the labor upon the subject matter and its verbal formulation’ (2005c,
p. 133). This does not mean that there is pre-linguistic thought which needs
to be given linguistic articulation, but rather that thought itself is a dynamic
relation between concepts and objects, a spark resulting from the collision
of these two incommensurable elements, the material and the linguistic.
However, encouraging the student to give the experience of the object
linguistic form is not exactly an invitation to engage in dialogue or opine in
a discussion. The linkage between thinking and open discussion is prevalent
in Anglo-American scholarship on education for thinking, in which active
participation in public deliberation is understood as necessary for giving
form to thought, for elucidating and refining it (Lipman, 2003). For Adorno,
on the other hand, the discursive practice is completely subordinated to
instrumental reason and the logic of domination, namely to the attempt to
win the argument at any price:
[E]verywhere discussion is called for, certainly initially out of an
anti-authoritarian impulse. But discussion, which by the way, like the
public sphere, is an entirely bourgeois category, has been completely
ruined by tactics [ . . . ] Discussion serves manipulation. Every argu-
ment, untroubled by the question of whether it is sound, is geared to
a purpose [ . . . ] The opponent in a discussion becomes a functional
component of the current plan: [ . . . ] If the opponent does not con-
cede, then he will be disqualified and accused of lacking the qualities
presupposed by the discussion (2005f, pp. 268–269).
Furthermore, the very presupposition of a possible ‘a-priori agree-
ment between minds able to communicate with each other’, namely the
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exchangeability of opinions, implies the unconditional surrender of each
interlocutor to standards set by the collective, and is thus founded on ‘com-
plete conformism’ (2002, p. 70).
Thinking, therefore, requires a special kind of interaction not onlywith the
object but also with other subjects. Rather than being an attempt to directly
influence and control the interlocutors, such interaction would be mediated
by the object, as each student offers his or her perspective on the subject
matter. Thus each student would be exposed to the different, non-identical
ways in which others use concepts, undermining the previous perception
of the object and calling for a re-articulation of previous conceptions and
dispositions.
Accordingly, for Adorno the most hospitable medium in which thinking
may take place is not speech but rather writing. Writing here is not an
external expression of a prior mental process or an auxiliary to such a
process, but rather an inseparable aspect of thinking itself. The thinking
student must become an active subject through writing on the object without
dominating it, and without attempting to dominate others through it; she
must write in a way that allows the object to remain subject-matter rather
than amute thing.Writing, therefore,must not impose a pre-existing formon
the object, a logical-conceptual scheme designed to analyse and exhaust it,
formalise its relations with other things, or use it as means for a certain end.
It must be a form that always remains sensitive to content, to experience;
a form that acknowledges the inherent impossibility of separating form
and content. Adorno calls such form or writing style an ‘essay’. Unlike
the argumentative article or research report, the Adornian essay is not an
attempt to formulate a valid logical argument, to prove a point in a way
that squeezes the rich material into an empty logical vessel: ‘In the essay,
concepts do not build a continuum of operations, thought does not advance
in a single direction, rather the aspects of the argument interweave as in a
carpet. The fruitfulness of the thoughts depends on the density of this texture.
Actually, the thinker does not think, but rather transforms himself into an
arena of intellectual experience, without simplifying it’ (2000, p. 101). The
essay is a formless form, a flexible form which changes according to its
content instead of imposing itself on it. It goes wherever the inner logic
of its subject matter takes it, well aware of the inherent failure of every
attempt at direct contact with the object, opting instead for a plurality of
indirect routes, of groping in an unknown terrain. This way it preserves the
active side of experience, that of trying, as well as its passive side, namely
receptivity.
The essay welcomes any content. Unlike traditional philosophical texts
which are preoccupied with big questions and abstract contents, ‘the essay
[ . . . ] revolts above all against the doctrine—deeply rooted since Plato—
that the changing and ephemeral is unworthy of philosophy’ (2000, p. 98).
There is no hierarchy among the objects of thought, and if we assume in
advance that certain objects are more important than others—that we can
determine which are worthy of thinking and writing and which are not—we
will be giving in to fixity and lack of self-reflection, prone ‘to neutralize
the key phenomena of social injustice as mere exceptions’ (2002, p. 125).
C© 2017 The Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain.
Minima Pedagogica 11
Hence not only ordinary curricular subject matter, brought to the table by the
teacher, can be food for thought; it can be anything the student encounters
in her everyday life, no matter how seemingly trivial. The essay, moreover,
welcomes any length. As it is carried away by its object, it may be quite
lengthy in the attempt to break through the veil of given categories; but it
is often very short: ‘It thinks in fragments just as reality is fragmented and
gains its unity only bymoving through the fissures, rather than by smoothing
them over’ (2000, p. 104).
The best example of such fragmentary writing is of course Minima
Moralia, the collection of aphorisms written by Adorno in 1944–1947,
in which he develops a moral and sociopolitical critique of contemporary
society through ‘micro-analyses’ of various objects of experience, from
the most mundane to the most refined products of high culture. As Roger
Foster makes clear, such writing, which lingers with the particular to the
point where social conditions are disclosed through it, which exaggerates
to reveal the truth, is ‘not simply [ . . . ] a theory of resistance to wrong
life, but rather [ . . . ] a performance of ethical resistance through its in-
trinsic aesthetic arrangement’ (2011, p. 85). One does not have to be ed-
ucated like Adorno to write an essay, however. No previous knowledge
or experience are required, only willingness to study the objects, to be a
student.
Note that Adorno explicitly posits the writing of essays against the kind
of teaching usually practiced in school. He writes that ‘[t]he way in which
the essay appropriates concepts is most easily comparable to the behavior of
a man who is obliged, in a foreign country, to speak that country’s language
instead of patching it together from its elements, as he did in school’ (2000,
p. 101). Schoolteachers attempt to protect their students by teaching them
the Cartesian wisdom that studying must proceed carefully from the most
simple and elementary to themore complex,while theAdornian essay jumps
right into the heart of the matter, ready to confront the object of experience
in its full richness and complexity—to speak the language of the object
rather than the one the subject already masters. In much the same way,
Adorno invokes ‘the words of the schoolmaster’ as blaming the essay for
not being exhaustive, for failing to fully grasp the object and systematically
present all its relevant aspects (2000, p. 103).
Nevertheless, this does not mean that the essay cannot find its place
in school. Adorno’s position may also be understood as a call for al-
ternative teaching, very different from the one accepted today. I suggest
that for Adorno, the essay is the scholastic form par excellence—the one
most fit for school, as it privileges neither the teacher’s knowledge nor
the subject-student’s needs, but rather subject-matter itself. The teacher’s
role may therefore be characterised as one of inviting the students to write
essays and helping them do so. It is no doubt impossible to teach how
to write essays the same way more formal and structured writing styles
can be taught, but the teacher may certainly lend the struggling student
a hand.
To be sure, the essay is not an automatic, expressive or associa-
tive style of writing centred on the writer’s inner world. Rejecting the
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absolute authority of logical formality does not amount to total freedom
of all rationality: ‘the essay is not situated in simple opposition to dis-
cursive procedure. It is not unlogical; rather it obeys logical criteria in
so far as the totality of its sentences must fit together coherently’ (2000,
p. 109). Although the essay enjoys aesthetic autonomy, it is distinct from
art ‘through its conceptual character and its claim to truth free of aesthetic
semblance’ (2000, p. 94). Its writing, therefore, needs to vacillate constantly
between the rationale of pure logic and that of the object, and respect both
without yielding to either. In writing an essay, even more than in other
writing styles, the author must pay heed to the most precise nuances in
describing the object (2002, p. 221), and make sure that in every paragraph
‘the central motif stands out clearly enough’ (2002, p. 85). This requires
‘unlimited efforts’ (2000, p. 105). The teacher, therefore, is often needed
as an external support and even an authority which can demand the ef-
fort, insist on the rewriting of drafts and encourage thoughtful, attentive
writing.
Adorno’s criticism of common communicative and discursive practices,
therefore, does not mean rejecting any form of interaction or collaboration
in education. The central place given to writing in Adornian education for
thinking—especially the writing of essays focused on objects rather than
on the readers—may reinforce the false impression that such education is
best achieved in isolation, in the intimacy of student and teacher, hence
running against one of the essential features of school education, namely
the plurality of students. I argue, however, that this is not the case—that
plurality is essential to the Adornian essay and that school is its natural
abode. Although communication with readers is not the ultimate aim of the
essay form, as it is founded on dialogue with the object rather than other
subjects, it need not be a kind of closet writing. Essays need to be read,
and a certain form of interaction between writers and readers is certainly
welcomed by the essay form. An essay written by one student may be
read by others and compel them to react, think and write. A school where
essays are written thus becomes a special kind of community: Not one of
argumentation or discussion but one of writers and readers, a collective of
thinkers. Communication in such a community is mediated, and requires
time and effort (Heins, 2012, p. 78). It renounces in advance all attempts
to persuade, to influence directly. It is what Adorno calls a ‘message in a
bottle’ (Hellings, 2012), sent to the world without knowing in advance who
will pick it up and what effects it will have. This is precisely why the essay
is political—not in the ‘activist’ sense, which renounces thinking, but in the
Adornian sense of recognising that thought itself is always already critical
and political.
This brings us to the final point. The reflection on essayist writing as
a form of thought and of thinking as a form of political resistance re-
veals an interesting aspect of Adorno’s relation to childhood. Various ref-
erences to contemporary youth as infantile and stupid (2002, p. 22), as
well as the adoption of the Kantian concepts of maturity and responsibil-
ity (1999), create the impression that Adorno, like Kant, limits political
subjectivity to grown-ups. However, the essay, to which ‘luck and play are
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essential’ (2000, p. 93), is explicitly linked to childhood: ‘Instead of achiev-
ing something scientifically, or creating something artificially, the effort of
the essay reflects a childlike freedom that catches fire, without scruple, on
what others have already done’ (ibid.). There is a childlike quality in the
essay’s essential freedom, in the rejection of accepted forms to avoid assim-
ilation into existing society. Children, writes Adorno in Minima Moralia,
are aware ‘of the contradiction between phenomenon and fungibility that
the resigned adult no longer sees, and they shun it. Play is their defence’
(2002, p. 228). The playful essay is therefore reluctant yet merry, lacking
in positive vision yet critical, naı¨ve yet political. The political subject who
thinks and writes essays is childlike, and every child can be a political
subject. After all, who knows better than children to simply say no?
CONCLUSION:MIMIMA PEDAGOGICA
I have shown how education, and education for thinking in particular,
can be an active form of political resistance according to Adorno. This
does not mean that such education promises wonders. This is not exactly
‘educational activism’, as Tyson E. Lewis suggests (2006), for according
to Adorno activism implies simplistic separation of theory and praxis in
which the latter is given precedence. Education for thinking that follows
in Adorno’s footsteps challenges many existing educational practices, but
its political aspirations are rather modest. I suggest this education be called
minima pedagogica—not in a sense that would imply that education is
unimportant, of course, nor in the sense of non-interventionist, ‘hands off’
education, but in the sense Adorno gave his ownwriting inMinimaMoralia:
Philosophical activity that refuses to be magna moralia, namely a unified,
fully elaborated grand theory aimed at guiding the perplexed. This would be
a minor, minimal pedagogy of liberation—it can offer the student nothing
but better understanding of the reality of domination, in which lies only a
glimmer of hope for something different, the exact nature of which cannot
be known.
The problems attendant on this educational project are obvious. Educa-
tion for thinking as discussed here is in clear conflict with other purposes
Adorno ascribes to education, such as bequeathing high culture (French and
Thomas, 1999, p. 3), or the claim that students need to be ‘shown’ how
false and distorted cultural products are (1999, p. 31). Moreover, Adorno’s
rejection of any action apart from thinking, his refusal of any concrete
political action, even one which may bring temporary, partial relief from
suffering, borders on practical resignation and acceptance of social real-
ity for what it is. It seems, sometimes, that it would not be a bad idea to
bring into Adorno’s thinking something of the Deweyan pragmatic spirit—
a desire to do something beyond thinking, reading and writing; to get out
of the classroom, lecture hall or library, to expect results. In this article,
however, I have tried to suspend such criticisms, to surrender as much as
possible to the object that is Adorno’s writings, to let it be a subject mat-
ter that speaks through my own writing. As the academic setting does not
allow for a genuine Adornian essay, this is merely an honest attempt to
C© 2017 The Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain.
14 I. Snir
listen to what Adorno says about education and thinking, and think them
together.2
Correspondence: Dr. Itay Snir, The Minerva Humanities Center, Tel




1. To be sure, this discussion does not exhaust Dewey’s concept of experience. In other contexts,
especially in relation to art and aesthetics, he presents a more complex conception of experience,
which is not modeled after the scientific method subsuming particulars under general laws but rather
lingers on the object in an attempt to make it a significant aspect of the subject’s life (Dewey, 1980;
Hohr, 2013).
2. This article was written during an EMAIL Erasmus Mundus post-doctoral fellowship at the Labo-
ratory for Education and Society at the University of Leuven, Belgium. I thank Jan Masschelein,
Stefan Ramaekers and all members of the Laboratory for providing me with a wonderful intellectual
environment and for helpful comments on the manuscript. Special thanks are also due to Anat
Ascher and Naveh Frumer for reading and commenting on various versions of the text.
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